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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
In these consolidated appeals, Vincent P. Aschinger appeals in Docket 
No. 35684 from the judgment and sentence entered upon his conditional guilty 
plea to video voyeurism, claiming the district court imposed an excessive 
sentence and erred in denying his motion to suppress. Aschinger also appeals in 
Docket No. 35677 from the judgment and sentence entered upon his conditional 
guilty plea to felony injury to a child, claiming his sentence is excessive. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedinns In Docket No. 35677 
The state charged 35-year-old Aschinger with lewd conduct with a minor 
under sixteen in Kootenai County Case No. 06-24866 (hereinafter "Docket No. 
35677") after he put his hands down the front of twelve-year-old M.W.'s pants, 
asked her if she had "hair down there," and attempted to penetrate her vagina 
with his fingers. (R., pp.15, 65-66.) Aschinger pled guilty' to an amended 
charge of felony injury to child (R., pp.188-92), and the district court imposed a 
unified ten-year sentence with five years fixed (R., pp.205-06). 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedinus In Docket No. 35684 
During the investigation of M.W.'s case, M.W. reported that her friend, 
sixteen-year-old S.P., had told her Aschinger had filmed her naked earlier in the 
summer. (R., p.17.) Approximately four months later, Aschinger's wife, Kristen, 
took their laptop computer to the Post Falls Police Department after finding 
' Aschinger entered his guilty plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 
25(1970). (#35677Tr., p.lO,L.20-p.12, L.4.) 
inappropriate pictures of S.P. stored on the computer. (#35684 Tr., p.11, L.18 - 
p.14, L.25, p.30, L.15 - p.31, L.4.) On that computer, police discovered "several" 
images of "young women, some clothed, some not," and a file titled using S.P.'s 
first name, which included pictures of her in a two-piece bathing suit playing on a 
slip and slide. (#35684 Tr., p.54, Ls.5-20.) The photos of S.P. playing on the slip 
and slide were focused on her genitals, breasts, and buttocks. (#35684 Tr., p.54, 
L.24 - p.5, L.1.) Law enforcement also discovered a "movie file" depicting S.P. 
changing into her two-piece bathing suit. (#35684 Tr., p.55, Ls.5-10.) 
The state charged Aschinger with video voyeurism in Kootenai Couunty 
Case No. 07-11983 (hereinafter "Docket No. 35684.") (R., pp.48-49, 63-64.) 
Aschinger filed a motion to suppress, seeking suppression of "any and all 
evidence gathered . . . through the computer that was seized by the police from 
the defendant's estranged wife." (R., p.76.) More specifically, Aschinger claimed 
the consent to search the computer "was obtained by [sic] a person who lacked 
actual or apparent authority" to give consent. (R. p.111) The district court 
denied the motion. (#35684 Tr., pp.78-86.) Aschinger thereafter entered a 
conditional guilty plea reserving his right to appeal the denial of his suppression 
motion. (R., pp.178-79.) The district court imposed a fixed three-year sentence 
to run concurrent to the sentence imposed in Docket No. 35677 and consecutive 
to the sentence imposed in a separate Latah County case.2 (R., pp.202-03.) 
The sentence in Docket No. 35677 was also ordered to run consecutive to the 
Latah County sentence. (R., p.206.) 
Aschinger filed a timely notice of appeal in both cases (R., pp.208-15), 
and the cases were consolidated for purposes of appeal pursuant to Aschinger's 
motion (R., p.227). 
ISSUES 
Aschinger states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Aschinger's 
motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the search 
of his laptop because this search exceeded the scope of Ms. 
Aschinger's apparent authority to consent to the search and also 
exceeded the scope of her own private search of the laptop? 
2. Did the district court impose excessive sentences in 35677 
and 35684, and thereby abuse its discretion? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.8.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Aschinger failed to establish the district court erred in denying his 
motion to suppress? 
2.  Has Aschinger failed to establish the district court abused its discretion in 
imposing a unified ten-year sentence with five years fixed upon Aschinger's guilty 
plea to felony injury to child in Docket No. 35677 or by imposing a three-year 
fixed sentence, which Aschinger specifically requested, upon his guilty plea to 
video voyeurism in Docket No. 35684? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Aschinqer Has Failed To Establish Error In The Denial Of His Suppression 
Motion 
A. Introduction 
Aschinger challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that his 
wife Kristen did not have authority to consent to the search of their laptop and 
that, even if she did, the scope of the search was unlawful because law 
enforcement searched files in addition to those discovered by Kristen. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.9-19.) Aschinger's claim fails. The district court correctly 
concluded the search of the laptop, conducted pursuant to Kristen's consent, did 
not violate Aschinger's rights. 
8. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. 
Klinoler, 143 ldaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006); State v. Barker, 136 
ldaho 278, 280,40 P.3d 86, 88 (2002); State v. Spencer, 139 ldaho 736, 738, 85 
P.3d 1135, 1137 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Devore, 134 ldaho 344, 346-47, 2 P.3d 
153, 155-56 (Ct. App. 2000). 
C. The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Denvinq 
Aschinaer's Motion To Suppress 
The district court denied Aschinger's suppression motion, concluding: 
The evidence in front of this Court here certainly establishes 
that Kristen Aschinger was not acting through any direction of law 
enforcement when she retrieved the computer, which apparently 
her and her husband jointly owned and had possessed within their 
home, upon discovering the photos that gave rise to her concern. 
She produced that computer to law enforcement who ultimately 
inspected the computer further and concluded that there was 
evidence that apparently is incriminating that the state intends to 
offer against Mr. Aschinger. 
The evidence in this particular case has not really 
established that this laptop computer really possessed any type of 
personal restrictions in the manner that's been really argued here. 
Certainly, Ms. Aschinger has testified that she was familiar 
that at some times that there perhaps may or may not have been 
passwords, but she wasn't even able to verify that there was some 
kind of password protection that would deal with the three different 
users on this computer. 
The demonstration of Ms. Aschinger would indicate 
essentially there were three user accounts and that one simply 
needed to click on one of the three user accounts to ascertain 
whatever information may be contained within that user account. 
Now, this appeared to be a laptop computer that was 
obviously initially obtained by Mr. Aschinger for the purposes of his 
schooling and was kept in the home, however, and was acquired at 
a time the parties were married and, presumptively, it was 
community property. 
And certainly the evidence would establish that Kristen 
Aschinger had access and control and even arguably ownership 
over the computer, notwithstanding the fact there may have been 
separate users accounts established within the computer. The 
evidence certainly indicates that this laptop was simply left at the 
house, and there certainly is an indication that the laptop was 
formatted in such a fashion that it had availability to not only 
members of the household but also guests, apparently, by virtue of 
the three different user accounts. 
(#35684 Tr., p.80, L.13 - p.82, L.13.) 
Aschinger acknowledges that both he and Kristen "had overall access to 
the computer's hard drive," but nevertheless argues Kristen "did not have mutual 
use, or joint access and control, of the personal effects and information that was 
stored exclusively on [his] account" because she "never made any attempt to 
access that private information . . .."3 Whether Kristen ever actually made an 
"attempt to access" all of Aschinger's private information is, however, irrelevant to 
whether she had authority to consent to a search of the laptop. 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless searches of an individual's 
home or possessions absent certain limited exceptions. Illinois v. Rodriauez, 497 
U.S. 177, 181 (1990). One clearly recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement is consent from an individual who has actual or apparent authority to 
submit to the search. State v. Reynolds, 146 Idaho 466, -, 197 P.3d 327, 333 
Aschinger also argues the district court incorrectly concluded Aschinger "did not 
enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in his laptop," a conclusion he claims 
was "predicated on an erroneous factual finding that the computer was in a 
'public space"' and a "misplaced reliance on the case of U.S. v. Barrows, 481 
F.3d 1246 (loih Cir. 1246 [sic])." (Appellant's Brief, p.12.) However, the district 
court made no such finding. Although the district court "note[d] the holding" in 
Barrows, and specifically the conclusion that the defendant in that case did not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his personal computer because he 
moved it to a "public space and took no measures to protect its contents from 
public inspection," the court never held Aschinger had no expectation of privacy. 
(#35684 Tr., p.82, L.14 - p.83, L.7.) To the contrary, the court specifically 
acknowledged Barrows was "not specifically" or "exactly on point," and 
referenced it only for the purpose of explaining "some of the facts that have been 
provided here in terms of this computer," which demonstrate that Kristen had 
access to and control over the laptop and, therefore, authority to consent to its 
search. (#35684 Tr., p.82, L.2 - p.83, L.17.) 
(Ct. App. 2008) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S 218 (1973); State v. 
Stewart, 145 ldaho 641, 644, 181 P.3d 1249, 1252 (Ct. App. 2008)). "Actual 
authority exists if the consenting party shares with the defendant common 
authority over the place searched." Revnolds, 146 Idaho at -, 197 P.3d at 
334. As explained by the United States Supreme Court: 
Common authority is, of course, not to be implied from the 
mere property interest a third party has in the property. The 
authority which justifies the third-party consent does not rest upon 
the law of property, with its attendant historical and legal 
refinements, but rests rather on mutual use of the property by 
persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, 
so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants 
has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the 
others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit 
the common area to be searched. 
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974) (internal citations 
omitted). 
"[Mlarried couples generally have common authority over the premises 
they share." Revnolds, 146 Idaho at -, 197 P.3d at 334 (citations omitted). 
Although such authority "does not necessarily translate into authority to search 
specific containers," if there is "mutual use of the property" with "joint access or 
control for most purposes," or if "the law enforcement officer had an objectively 
reasonable belief that the consenting party possessed authority over the place to 
be searched," one spouse's consent will be a valid basis for conducting the 
search. Revnolds, 146 ldaho at -, 197 P.3d at 334-35. "[lln evaluating a claim 
of apparent authority, the proper inquiry is whether the facts available to the 
officers at the moment warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the 
consenting party had authority over the premises." State v. Buhler, 137 ldaho 
685, 688, 52 P.3d 329, 332 (Ct. App. 2002) (citations, quotations, and alterations 
omitted). 
As noted by the district court, the evidence presented at the suppression 
hearing established that Kristen had access and control over the laptop, including 
"free access" to the photos stored on the laptop. (#35684 Tr., p.13, Ls.14-18 
("free access" to file containing photos), p.15, L.23 - p.16, L.2 (Kristen and 
Aschinger ''jointly" used the laptop, usage was "50/50"), p. 16, Ls. 18-25 (Kristen 
unaware of any "claim" by Aschinger to the laptop in the divorce), p.24, Ls.1-25 
(Kristen always viewed pictures on laptop using Aschinger's "account").) Further, 
when Kristen took the laptop to the Post Falls Police Department, she "agreed" 
law enforcement "would keep the computer" and gave "permission to access the 
computer to find out what was on the computer." (#35684 Tr., p.38, Ls.7-10.) 
Detective David Beck, who received the laptop from Kristen, specifically testified 
that Kristen told him "it was her computer'' and Kristen "made it sound like it was 
generally used for everybody." (#35684 Tr., p.39, Ls.10-17.) In addition, 
Detective Beck testified he "talked about access" with Kristen and "she made it 
clear to [him] that there wasn't anything that was on the computer that she wasn't 
able to access that [Aschinger] had protected." (#35684 Tr., p.41, Ls.12-18.) 
Contrary to Aschinger's assertions on appeal, this evidence clearly establishes 
Kristen had actual authority to consent to the search of the laptop or, at a 
minimum, apparent authority to do so. See, e.q., Revnolds, 146 Idaho at -, 
197 P.3d at 335 (upholding conclusion that wife had at least apparent authority to 
search box in home where "officers knew that the box was located in the marital 
home" and that wife "could readily access it by simply finding the correct key on a 
ring of keys located nearby"); United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 719 (loth 
Cir. 2007) (Noting "[tlhird party apparent authority to consent to a search has 
generally been upheld when the computer is located in a common area of the 
home that is accessible to other family members under circumstances indicating 
the other family members were not excluded from using the computer" and 
concluding it was objectively reasonable for law enforcement to believe that 
individual who consented to search of computer was a "user of the computer" 
even if he "had no actual ability to use the computer and the computer was 
password protected"); United States v. Ruiz, 428 F.3d 877 (gth Cir. 2005) (finding 
it reasonable to believe individual had authority to consent to search of gun case 
where individual lived in home where gun case was stored, had access to and 
control over gun case, and never disclaimed ownership). 
Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2001), upon which Aschinger 
relies, does not compel a contrary conclusion. (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) Trulock 
involved a § 1983 action against the FBI by Trulock and Linda Conrad, Trulock's 
executive assistant who also lived with him. Id. at 397-98. The FBI was 
investigating Trulock and interviewed Conrad as part of their investigation. td. 
During the interview, Conrad consented to a search of Conrad's and Trulock's 
house, including their computer. Id. at 398. In deciding whether the FBI had 
qualified immunity, the court concluded Conrad's consent was involuntary 
because one FBI agent had incorrectly told her they had a warrant. Id. at 402. 
The court further concluded that even if Conrad's consent was voluntary, it would 
not have been sufficient to "authorize the search of Trulock's private, password- 
protected files." Id. The Fourth Circuit reasoned: 
Trulock's password-protected files are analogous to the 
locked footlocker inside the bedroom. By using a password, 
Trulock affirmatively intended to exclude Conrad and others from 
his personal files. Moreover, because he concealed his password 
from Conrad, it cannot be said that Trulock assumed the risk that 
Conrad would permit others to search his files. Thus, Trulock had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the password-protected 
computer files and Conrad's authority to consent to the search did 
not extend to them. Trulock, therefore, has alleged a violation of 
his Fourth Amendment rights. 
Trulock, 275 F.3d at 403. 
The court's conclusion in Trulock does not, however, stand for the 
proposition that a joint user of a computer never has authority to consent to a 
search of that computer. The Fourth Circuit made this clear in United States v. 
Buckner, 473 F.3d 551 (4'h Cir. 2007). In Buckner, police "received a series of 
complaints regarding online fraud committed by someone using AOL and eBay 
accounts opened in the name of Michelle Buckner." 473 F.3d at 552. When 
police spoke with Mrs. Buckner she acknowledged she leased a computer but 
told them she "knew nothing about any illegal eBay transactions," and stated 
"she only used the home computer occasionally to play solitaire." Id. Mrs. 
Buckner later gave law enforcement consent to search the computer and stated 
her willingness to fully cooperate in the investigation. Id. 
After searching Mrs. Buckner's computer, police discovered information 
which led to an indictment against Mrs. Buckner's husband on several counts of 
wire and mail fraud. Id. Buckner moved to suppress the evidence claiming Mrs. 
Buckner had no authority to consent to the search because she did not have 
"common authority over his computer files," a fact he contended officers should 
have known because Mrs. Buckner "told them that she was not computer-savvy 
and that she only used the computer to play games." Id. at 555. The Fourth 
Circuit rejected this argument concluding that although Mrs. Buckner did not 
have actual authority to consent to a search of Buckner's password-protected 
files "under the Trulock rationale," she had apparent authority to do so. k at 
554-55. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted the "computer was located 
in a common living area of the Buckners' marital home," the computer was on 
when law enforcement seized it even though Buckner was not home, law 
enforcement knew the computer was leased solely in Mrs. Buckner's name and 
could be returned by her without Buckner's knowledge or consent, and "the 
officers did not have any indication from [Mrs. Buckner], or any of the attendant 
circumstances, that any files were password-protected." Id. at 555. Further, 
"[elven during the mirroring and forensic analysis processes, nothing the officers 
saw indicated that any computer files were encrypted or password-protected." 
Id. 
-
As in Buckner, the Aschingers' laptop was located in the "marital home" 
and, in fact, Aschinger no longer lived in the home where the laptop remained. 
Further, Kristen was able to turn on the computer and access the pictures stored 
by Aschinger on his "user account" without the need for a password. In addition, 
there was no "indication from [Kristen], or any of the attendant circumstances, 
that any files were password-protected,'' and "nothing the officers saw" "during 
the mirroring and forensic analysis processes . . . indicated that any computer 
files were encrypted or password-protected." Id.; see #35684 Tr., p.58, L.10 - 
p.59, L.2 (Detective Brantl, who imaged and searched the laptop, stated he 
believes the lLook program used to image the hard drive may be capable of 
circumventing passwords but notes "[ilt asks for the passwords when you're first 
imaging the drive," and he has "never ran into a password file at this point"), p.63, 
Ls.15-19 (ILook program would not remove passwords). 
Because Aschinger's files were not password protected and because the 
evidence establishes Kristen had actual, or at least apparent, authority to 
consent to the search of the laptop, Aschinger's claim that Kristen could not 
legitimately consent to a search of all files maintained on the laptop fails. 
Aschinger, relying on Walters v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980), 
"further asserts that the district court erred when it concluded that police did not 
exceed the private search by Mrs. Aschinger when they accessed files on the 
laptop that were not accessed by Ms. Aschinger." (Appellant's Brief, pp.16-18.) 
Although the district court addressed Aschinger's scope of the search argument, 
Aschinger's reliance on the limitations of governmental searches following private 
searches is misplaced. 
As explained in Walters, it is undoubtedly true that "the Government may 
not exceed the scope of [a] private search unless it has the right to make an 
independent search." 447 U.S. at 657. This holding, however, has no bearing 
on whether the government may search an item pursuant to the consent of an 
individual with authority to give such consent. Walters itself illustrates this point. 
In Walters, a package of 8 mm films was delivered to someone other than 
its intended recipient. 447 U.S. at 651. The people who actually received the 
shipment opened the package which contained the film reels. Id. at 651-52. The 
individual boxes of film had suggestive drawings and "explicit descriptions of the 
contents" indicating the films contained obscene material. Id. at 652. 
Consequently, the films were turned over to the FBI who ultimately opened the 
individual boxes and viewed the films contained therein. Id. at 652. 
In concluding the search was invalid, the Supreme Court noted that 
although the "FBI agents were lawfully in possession of the boxes of the film," 
that fact "did not given them authority to search their contents." Id. at 654. 
Importantly, the Court concluded, "the unauthorized exhibition of the films 
constituted an unreasonable invasion of their owner's constitutionally protected 
interest in privacy," because the exhibition "was a search; there was no warrant; 
the owner had not consented; and there were no exigent circumstances." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
Unlike in Walters, the "private search" of Aschinger's laptop was not 
conducted by some unrelated third party; it was conducted by a co-owner of the 
laptop who had unfettered access to and control of the laptop and its contents. 
The subsequent search conducted by law enforcement was with that owner's 
consent. As such, the principles articulated in Walters are inapposite. 
The district court correctly concluded that the search of Kristen's and 
Aschinger's laptop was properly conducted pursuant to Kristen's consent and did 
not violate any of Aschinger's rights. Aschinger's claim of error in relation to his 
suppression motion, therefore, fails. 
II. 
Aschinqer Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The Sentencina Court's 
Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Aschinger contends the district court abused its discretion in imposing his 
sentences given his "fairly minimal criminal history" "prior to 2006," the fact he 
has not "received the benefit of any therapeutic resources," his parents' alleged 
physical abuse, and the fact he "moved many times when he was younger, which 
was frustrating for [him] and led him to socially withdraw from many of his peers." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.21.) Aschinger's claim in relation to the sentence imposed 
for video voyeurism fails because the court imposed the sentence Aschinger 
requested. With respect to the sentence imposed for felony injury to child, 
because none of the factors cited by Aschinger establish the sentence is 
excessive, Aschinger has failed to show an abuse of the sentencing court's 
discretion 
B. Standard Of Review 
When a sentence is not illegal, the appellate court reviews the sentence 
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Kniahton, 143 Idaho 318, 319, 144 P.3d 23, 
24 (2006). 
C. Aschinqer Requested The Sentence Imposed For Video Voyeurism And 
Has Otherwise Failed To Establish His Sentences Are Excessive 
The applicable legal standards for reviewing a sentencing court's exercise 
of discretion are well established: "A sentence is reasonable if at the time of 
imposition it appears necessary to achieve 'the primary objective of protecting 
society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation 
or retribution applicable to the given case."' State v. Lundauist, 134 ldaho 831, 
836, 11 P.3d 27, 32 (2000) (quoting from State v. Toohill, 103 ldaho 565, 568, 
650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982)). To show an abuse of discretion, the 
defendant must show that the sentence, in light of the governing criteria, is 
excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. State v. Strand, 137 ldaho 
457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002). Where reasonable minds might differ, the 
sentences imposed by the district court must stand. m, 103 ldaho at 568, 
650 P.2d at 710. 
With respect to Aschinger's claim that his three-year fixed sentence for 
video voyeurism in Docket No. 35684 is excessive, this claim should be rejected 
as Aschinger is estopped, under the doctrine of invited error, from complaining 
that the sentence he requested or consented to was in error. A party is 
estopped, under the doctrine of invited error, from complaining that a ruling or 
action of the trial court that the party invited, consented to, or acquiesced in was 
error. State v. Carlson, 134 ldaho 389, 402, 3 P.3d 67, 80 (Ct. App. 2000). The 
appellate court will not review a sentence which the defendant agreed to or 
requested, unless the sentence exceeds statutory authority, or there is no 
apparent tactical purpose for the request. State v. Griffiths, 110 ldaho 613, 614, 
716 P.2d 1385, 1386 (Ct. App. 1986). At sentencing, Aschinger stated he would 
"not be asking for probation or anything other than imposition of sentence" and 
specifically asked the court to impose a sentence of "three years fixed or three 
and a half years fixed with no indeterminate" on the video voyeurism charge. 
(#35684 Tr., p.141, Ls.1-3, 13-15.) The court obliged Aschinger's request and 
imposed a three-year fixed sentence. Aschinger cannot now complain that 
sentence is excessive. 
As for Aschinger's claim that his ten-year sentence with five years fixed for 
felony injury to child is excessive, Aschinger has failed to establish an abuse of 
discretion. Although Aschinger's criminal history may be considered "minimal" in 
terms of number of convictions, it is significant in substance. Aschinger has prior 
convictions for aggravated assault with an enhancement for use of a deadly 
weapon and felony domestic battery. (PSI, pp.3-4.) The aggravated assault 
conviction stemmed from an incident in which Aschinger forced his wife Laura's 
head into the toilet and flushed it, forced Laura to have anal intercourse, tied her 
up with a curling iron cord, hit her with a leather belt, and pointed a 30-30 rifle at 
her. (PSI, pp.5, 7.) Further, although Aschinger does not have any prior sexual 
offenses involving children, it is noteworthy that he was victimizing two young 
girls during the same period of time. 
In imposing sentence, the district court noted the relevant factors (#35684 
Tr., p.145, L.23 - p.148, L.4), and noted its concern over Aschinger's history of 
"aggressive, violent behavior" that "has stemmed to some form of sexual 
deviancy" (#35684 Tr., p.151, Ls.12-15). Although, as Aschinger notes, it does 
not appear he has "received the benefit of any therapeutic resources," the court 
fashioned its sentence to give Aschinger "some measure of an incentive to seek 
out some kind of rehabilitative resources that may be available . . . in the 
institutional setting." (#35684 Tr., p.152, Ls.17-22.) The court was not required 
to do more in terms of rehabilitation, particularly since "[tlhe 'primary 
consideration [in imposing sentence] is, and presumptively always will be, the 
good order and protection of society."' State v. Butcher, 137 ldaho 125, 137, 44 
P.3d 1180, 1192 (Ct. App. 2002) (quoting State v. Moore, 78 ldaho 359, 363, 304 
P.2d 1101, 1103 (1 956)). 
The district court considered all the information before it, applied the 
correct legal standards and correctly determined the appropriate sentence in light 
of Aschinger's history and the nature of the offenses. The sentence imposed 
was not only warranted, but also necessary to achieve the primary sentencing 
objective of protecting society. Given any reasonable view of the facts, 
Aschinger has failed to establish an abuse of sentencing discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Aschinger's 
conviction and sentence in Docket No. 35684 and the sentence imposed in 
Docket No. 35677. 
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